1Association for Psychological Science
WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
APS WHITE PAPER
2Association for Psychological Science
APS is the global scientific home of more than 25,000 leading psychological
science researchers, practitioners, teachers, and students. We are dedicated
to advancing scientific psychology across disciplinary and geographic borders
and committed to:
• Promoting the integration of scientific perspectives across our diverse
field, and with other scientific disciplines
• Incentivizing global collaboration among researchers
• Catalyzing the further development of psychological science
• Promoting the application of psychological science to public policy
Association for Psychological Science 1
THE STATE OF MODERN MISINFORMATION
Vaccine Hesitancy and Resistance
WHY WE ACCEPT MISINFORMATION AS FACT
The Structure of Online Environments
Ineffective Retractions and Debunking
Assumption of Truth
Overestimating Our Own Knowledge
Prioritizing Potential Hazards
SOLUTIONS BACKED BY SCIENCE
Behavioral Interventions to Increase Vaccination
Words From an Expert
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Misinformation presents a distorted picture of reality. At a casual glance, misinformation
may seem plausible and even contain kernels of truth. This is merely a semblance, however,
as closer, more critical examination reveals. Without such careful scrutiny, misinformation
hobbles public understanding of critical topics such as climate change, vaccine efficacy, election
integrity, and more. Members of the public, however, often lack the necessary background to
identify misinformation, while science communicators and policymakers often lack the skills
needed to debunk misinformation once it has taken root. This white paper attempts to address
these shortcomings by collecting the best and most relevant psychological science research on
misinformation. The object is that stakeholders and the public will be able to apply these findings
to better evaluate and communicate news and information regardless of its source and emotional
impact. In The Demon Haunted World, famed astronomer and author Carl Sagan outlined what
he called a “baloney detection kit,” steps that people could follow when evaluating claims.
In the same spirit, the Association for Psychological Science developed this white paper as a
“misinformation prevention kit” for policymakers, the scientific community, the media, and the
public. In addition to a summary of salient information, the paper also presents science-based
solutions to combat misinformation and recommends several action items to catalyze next steps.
Solutions Backed by Science
• Prebunking: Promoting skeptical con-
sumption of media can help audiences
become more resistant to misinformation.
• Debunking: Misinformation is highly
resistant to change, but compelling cor-
rections, when repeated, can make a
• Enabling positive behaviors: When there is
a pressing need to change behaviors, as
with encouraging COVID-19 vaccinations
and other public health measures, inter-
ventions should target behavior directly by
making positive choices easier to make.
• Summit on misinformation: Convening key
stakeholders, both public and private, to
develop a science-based action plan to
• Public-awareness campaign: Developing
and disseminating tailored, publicly engag-
ing video, audio, and social media infor-
mation on how to recognize and counter
• Call for additional research: Identifying gaps
in understanding, building on promising
results with continued research, and con-
ducting critical analyses of the current body
3Association for Psychological Science
THE STATE OF MODERN MISINFORMATION
Rumors, conspiracy theories, and deceptive propaganda have long presented twisted views of re-
ality to misinform and manipulate the public. The speed and spread of modern misinformation,
however, have significantly magnified these threats to weaken the public’s ability to tell truth
from fiction and act accordingly (Kozyreva et al., 2020).
What is often overlooked is that social media platforms and search engines are for-profit enter-
prises. Their primary goal is to generate revenue, not to inform the public (Kozyreva et al., 2020).
To maximize profits, online platforms manipulate audiences into continuously engaging with
content without regard for the accuracy of the content being consumed.
Although online environments offer many social benefits—including a level of remote connectiv-
ity that has proved essential to the continued functioning of society throughout the COVID-19
pandemic—they have also amplified many of the harmful tendencies already present in print,
radio, and television media and human psychology more broadly (Kozyreva et al., 2020).
Even when these harms are unintentional, they can develop rapidly and grow resistant to correc-
tion. Preliminary news reports generated by the 24-hour news cycle, which are often incomplete
and unverified, can spread rapidly online and become fixed in the public imagination, rendering
them resistant to correction even as new information comes to light (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
A potent combination of the content-recommendation algorithms common on platforms like
Facebook and YouTube, which aim to keep audiences engaged by serving up “likable” content
similar to what they’ve viewed already, paired with users’ own preference to engage with people
who share their existing beliefs can also contribute to the creation of one-sided “echo chambers.”
In these self-contained ecosystems of information, even highly uncommon beliefs—such as
claims among “flat Earthers” that there is a global conspiracy to hide the fact that the world is
flat—are presented without opposition, leading to the perception that a sizable number of other
people share the same views (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). This further enables the spread of mis-
information through the development of “multiple realities” tailor-made for particular audiences,
in which “alternative” facts and narratives that cater to peoples’ wishful thinking and political
biases may be accepted as objective truth with little or no evidence (Kozyreva et al., 2020).
More cynically, political forces may knowingly exploit psychological blind spots to intentionally
sow disinformation—a form of misinformation that is created to harm an individual or group or
to sway public opinion toward a particular political ideology (Kozyreva et al., 2020). Disinforma-
tion can spread rapidly in online environments, but its use has a long and disheartening history.
In a classic example, the tobacco industry promoted claims that cigarettes were not toxic despite
possessing compelling evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer (Lewandowsky et
Apply influencers’ interventions: Prebunking and debunking tactics
can disrupt self-contained ecosystems of misinformation, but only if the
message is championed by trusted members of the in group.
Target sources: Influencer intervention must occur in the sources and
channels favored by proponents and consumers of misinformation.
Disarming interactions: Messages, messengers, and associated media
must be approachable and nonthreatening to group and individual
identity. Confrontational tactics trigger outrage and anger, preventing
the penetration and retention of messages.
5Association for Psychological Science
Vaccine Hesitancy and Resistance
Vaccine misinformation is not a new phenomenon. From polio to smallpox, as new vaccines have
emerged, so too have anti-vax voices. Countering this historical trend, however, has taken on
new urgency as anti-vaccination activists attempt to undermine broad acceptance of vaccines—
not only for COVID-19 but for countless other vaccine-preventable diseases.
The talking points of vaccine misinformation are as varied as they are ominous: damaging side
effects, inferiority of approved vaccines to so-called natural immunity, and sinister motives to
impose control over the public through genetic or other biological manipulation.
The impact of these efforts is evidenced in the lagging numbers of vaccinations following the
initial wave. In December 2020, when coronavirus vaccines were not yet widely available to the
public, 73% of American adults reported that they were open to getting vaccinated eventually,
and, as of January 2022, 77% of American adults reported having received at least one shot (Kai-
ser Family Foundation, 2022). The percentage of Americans who have reported actively refusing
to get vaccinated against COVID-19 has remained largely unchanged, however, hovering at a
stubborn 15% over the previous year.
Perhaps the most infamous piece of modern antivaccination misinformation—the widely dis-
proved claim that routine childhood vaccines cause autism spectrum disorder—can be traced
back to a highly flawed 1998 study that has since been retracted and has failed to replicate on
numerous occasions (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). And yet the myth persists, demonstrating just
how correction-resistant vaccine misinformation can be.
WHY WE ACCEPT MISINFORMATION AS FACT
Psychological science has uncovered many factors that can make people vulnerable to misinfor-
mation at both the societal and individual level.
The unending tsunami of new content can also contribute to a sense of information
overload (Kozyreva et al., 2020). Many platforms encourage users to engage shallowly
with the many sources competing for their attention, rather than slowing down to con-
sider the accuracy of the information being consumed.
1 The Structure of Online Environments
2 Information Overload
3 Failed Retractions and Debunking
Online platforms encourage users to consume and share content by pressing our “psy-
chological hot buttons” (Kozyreva et al., 2020). The most shareable media often capture
our attention by focusing on negative emotions like fear, disgust, and moral outrage.
Influencers, for good or ill, can publish content directly to social media, personal web-
sites, and other platforms with little to no oversight or fact-checking. Without knowl-
edgeable gatekeepers, opinion can appear as fact and misinformation can be monetized
Misinformation is highly “sticky,” limiting the effectiveness of retractions and other
attempts to debunk false information once a person has accepted an idea as accurate
(Lewandowsky, 2012). Retractions that simply label a previous statement as incorrect
can backfire by causing individuals who believe the misinformation to focus on gen-
erating their own counterarguments, inadvertently strengthening their existing beliefs
(Chan et al., 2017). This is particularly likely when rejecting the misinformation would
conflict with a person’s existing worldview and political beliefs (Murphy et al., 2019).
7Association for Psychological Science
2 Assumption of Truth
3 Overestimating Our Own Knowledge
4 Prioritizing Potential Hazards
Anyone can be taken in by misinformation, but research suggests that users ages 65
and older view and share the majority of misleading “fake news” on social media plat-
forms like Facebook and Twitter (Brashier & Schacter, 2020). In addition to being less
experienced with digital media than “online natives,” older adults may prioritize social
connection over accuracy when communicating online.
People tend to operate under the assumption that the information other people, and
even unknown sources, present to them is accurate (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Pen-
nycook et al., 2020; Rapp 2016). In the absence of fact-checking or having a specific
reason to doubt the quality of a source, people are unlikely to expend the cognitive effort
necessary to critically evaluate information (Kozyreva et al., 2020; Lewandowsky et al.,
People are not always accurate judges of their own knowledge (Atir et al., 2015). People
who perceive themselves to be experts on a topic, regardless of their actual expertise or
education, are more likely to claim familiarity with made-up concepts.
Individuals tend to prioritize information about potential hazards, and this bias has been
found to be stronger in people who are more politically conservative (Fessler et al., 2017).
In humans’ evolutionary past, acting on information about potential harms may have
helped people to survive in uncertain circumstances. In modern societies, however, this
tendency can cause people to act on misinformation about potential dangers despite clear
evidence that a threat does not actually exist. In the case of COVID-19 vaccination, mis-
information about potential hazards can interfere with how people appraise risks related
to infection with the virus and the use of vaccines to prevent it (Brewer et al., 2017). These
appraisals may involve the perceived likelihood of becoming infected, the possible severity
of the infection, and confidence about vaccines’ effectiveness as well as their potential side
effects. Overall, however, the extent to which an individual expects they would regret not
getting vaccinated if they were to get sick appears to most strongly predict vaccination.
5 Social Norms
The social norms based on these perceptions of risk—such as rates of vaccination or
mask wearing—appear to spread through social networks, causing people to emulate
behaviors they perceive as more common within their social groups (Brewer et al.,
2017). People also tend to weigh the risk of infection or illness against the loss of social
standing within their circle of friends, which means they may evaluate the social benefit
of not vaccinating as outweighing the risk of contracting COVID.
People with “science-skeptical” attitudes are more motivated to reject scientific consen-
sus, such as evolution or the existence of human-caused climate change, on ideological
grounds (Hornsey, 2020). People with a higher need to live in a structured world are also
more likely to attribute journalistic errors to international conspiracy than accidental
misrepresentation (Axt et al., 2020). People of any political affiliation are more likely to
accept misinformation that aligns with their worldview (Kozyreva et al., 2020; Lewand-
owsky et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2019).
9Association for Psychological Science
SOLUTIONS BACKED BY SCIENCE
Psychological scientists have identified several types of interventions that appear to measurably
improve our ability to reject and reconsider misinformation. In addition to the interventions
outlined below, policymakers can help create an “internet for citizens” by regulating online en-
vironments in ways that empower users to control their digital lives, maintain privacy, and more
easily determine the quality of sources (Kozyreva et al., 2020). In the past several years, for ex-
ample, the European Union increased its regulation of data security and introduced a Code of
Practice on Disinformation, but regulations must continue to adapt alongside the world’s digital
Although debunking misinformation requires individuals to let go of false beliefs they may have
already incorporated into their worldview, “prebunking” can help prevent these beliefs from tak-
ing root in the first place by “inoculating” an audience against misinformation before exposure
(Kozyreva et al., 2020).
Prebunking can take many forms, including warning tags on content that may contain misinfor-
mation and public education about the prevalence and effects of misinformation, as well as how
to evaluate the accuracy of sources more effectively (Kozyreva et al., 2020; Lewandowsky et al.,
2012). Informing the public about the manipulative strategies used to spread political disinfor-
mation can also help to render these tactics less effective (Kozyreva et al., 2020).
Misinformation is highly resistant to correction, but steps can still be taken to more effectively
debunk inaccuracies once an audience has accepted them as fact.
• Keep retractions and other attempts to correct misinformation straightforward and focused,
but don’t stop at simply labeling information as false (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Effective
retractions provide the audience with a new narrative of the events in question (Chan et al.,
2017), including an explanation for why and how the prior misinformation occurred (Le-
wandowsky et al., 2012). Conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation often provide
audiences with a clear-cut explanation for events where one was previously perceived to be
lacking. Corrections need to fill those gaps in order to supplant audiences’ existing beliefs.
• Information that is more familiar to us feels truer. Repeat retractions to counteract this famil-
iarity effect (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Wahlheim et al., 2020).
• Instead of challenging audiences’ worldview or other beliefs, corrections should aim to present
the new narrative in a narrowly focused way that affirms the audiences’ existing values (Le-
wandowsky et al., 2012). A real-world example of this is packaging the need to address climate
change as an opportunity to create green industry jobs for audiences that are not motivated
by environmental stewardship.
Fostering Positive Behaviors
Attitudes and beliefs doubtlessly influence our behavior, but few interventions that target only
attitudes and beliefs have been found to consistently change behavior (Brewer et al., 2017).
When there is a pressing need to change behavior, as is the case with COVID-19 vaccination
and other public health measures, experts suggest that interventions should target behavior
directly. This can be particularly effective when the desired behavioral change conflicts with an
audience’s worldview (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
One strategy that has been shown to shift behavior, according to Anastasia Kozyreva (Max
Planck Institute for Human Development) and colleagues, is “choice architecture,” which
uses psychological science to design the presentation of options or choices in ways that make
certain choices and behaviors easier to follow through on (Kozyreva et al., 2020). Although it is
possible to use choice architecture to influence an audience’s behavior without their knowledge
or consent—a strategy used by many platforms online—the researchers strongly suggest
countering misinformation with interventions that are transparent to the audience. This allows
people to remain active, autonomous participants in their own education and decision-making
while advancing societal well-being.
These strategies include:
• Technocognition: In the context of misinformation, this involves using cognitive science to introduce
additional “friction” to online environments (Kozyreva et al., 2020). Whereas technological innovations
generally focus on increasing the speed and simplicity of communication, technocognition takes the
opposite approach, intentionally slowing the rate of communication so that people have time to con-
sider the quality of information they are sharing. Examples include limiting how often people can post
content and requiring users to pass a reading-comprehension quiz before commenting on an article.
• Nudges: These can range from passive design choices, like putting graphic warnings on ciga-
rette packages, to proactive public-education campaigns in which individuals might be shown
statistics and other information related to the health risks caused by smoking (Kozyreva et
al., 2020). Nudges are generally built into the environment in which a decision will occur,
automatically exposing the target audience to the intervention (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Simple reminders about the need to consider the accuracy of headlines before sharing content
online, for example, have been shown to reduce the spread of misinformation (Pennycook et
al., 2020; Roozenbeek et al., 2021).
11Association for Psychological Science
• Boosts: These encourage the public to become “choice architects” of their own environments
by equipping themselves with the knowledge and skills necessary to make more reasonable
decisions about which information to trust and share (Kozyreva et al., 2020). Topic-specific
education on the value of scientific consensus, for example, has been found to help people
reduce the false belief that genetically modified foods are unsafe (van Stekelenburg et al., 2021).
This intervention was not found to increase people’s belief in human-caused climate change,
however, suggesting that highly politicized anti-science views may be more resistant to this
kind of correction. General skill building, such as education on how to accurately interpret
statistics, can also help reduce susceptibility to misinformation across domains (Kozyreva et
al., 2020). Other potential boosts relevant to misinformation include encouraging people to:
• Self-nudge: taking control of our device settings and physical environment—for
example, turning off notifications, hiding or deleting applications, and placing devices
where we can’t see them to reduce use
• Practice deliberate ignorance: choosing not to engage with certain sources or platforms
to cut out excessive, low-quality information
Behavioral Interventions to Increase Vaccination
A number of interventions designed to counter vaccine hesitancy by reducing logistical barriers to
care can help close the “intention–behavior gap” in settings where vaccines are affordable and readily
available to patients (Brewer et al. 2017).
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, several brief interventions were found to increase vaccine
• Recommendations from primary care doctors and other trusted healthcare practitioners
• Framing vaccination as the default option—for example, by interacting with patients under
the assumption that they want to be vaccinated or notifying patients about pre-scheduled
• Reminder systems that notify patients when they are due to be vaccinated and allow
them to schedule an appointment immediately by phone
12Association for Psychological Science 12
WORDS FROM AN EXPERT
DAVID N. RAPP, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
Encouraging evaluative mindsets, whether through brief interventions or
even K–12 education programs, can help people approach media more
skeptically, researcher David N. Rapp (Northwestern University) said in an
interview with APS. Inaccuracies can be challenging to undo once they have
been incorporated into a person’s larger knowledge network, explained
Rapp, who studies reading and misinformation. One strategy people can
use to more thoroughly interrogate ideas is engaging in “lateral reading,” or
reading multiple sources to verify overlapping information.
Rapp further suggests that future research could inform a more thorough
model of how and why misinformation has such problematic consequences.
Some open questions include:
• What are the long-term consequences of exposure to inaccurate ideas?
• How do different types of misinformation, such as declarative statements
(“the capital of Idaho is Boston”) versus assertions (“seatbelts don’t save
lives”), get processed differently?
• What can news organizations (and social media influencers and plat-
forms) do to give voice to different perspectives without inadvertently
misinforming the public by creating a sense of false balance? For ex-
ample, debates pitting climate-change scientists against deniers, which
became common in the early 2000s, may have inadvertently increased
the deniers’ credibility, causing the American public to perceive their
anti-science views as more viable than they really were.
13Association for Psychological Science
This white paper summarizes research-based guidance on identifying and combating misinfor-
mation. Even with this guidance, long-term and multipronged strategic programming is needed
to effect change.
Various public and private organizations have independently developed programs to combat mis-
information. Each of these efforts adds to a growing body of knowledge and best practices. As yet,
however, there is no coordinated plan to share these resources or actively encourage collaborations
to combat misinformation. To address these gaps, APS proposes the following next steps to build a
broader coalition of institutions and individuals dedicated to combating misinformation.
1 Summit on Misinformation
This white paper can serve as a catalyst to convene a multistakeholder summit on
misinformation. The goal of this meeting would be to build new links among experts,
share resources among existing programs, identify best practices, and encourage the
dissemination and uptake of science-based research on misinformation.
APS and its journals support scientific research on misinformation and enable its
publication and dissemination. More can be done, however, to identify gaps in our
understanding, build on promising results with continued research, and perform critical
analyses of the current body of knowledge. Recommendations on additional research
would be one of the main tracks of a summit on misinformation.
Online environments are often designed to discourage users from considering the qual-
ity of the information they consume and share. Misinformation that feeds into our
cognitive blind spots and biases can be tricky to undo, but psychological science pro-
vides several evidence-based interventions. These include prebunking misinformation
by educating audiences on how to consume media more skeptically, crafting more con-
vincing retractions and counterarguments by presenting new narratives that address
the concerns of specific audiences, and bypassing beliefs by targeting behavior change
directly. Taken together, these and future findings can help individuals defend against
misinformation while empowering the public to make more informed decisions.
3 Call for Additional Research
2 Public-Awareness Campaign
Research has identified ways that individuals, corporations, and the media can minimize
the spread and impact of misinformation, these recommendations are now widely
known and adopted. However, the public remains largely unaware of the hallmarks of
misinformation and the strategies to recognize and critically analyze false claims. With
support from foundations and federal agencies, an alliance of universities, corporations,
media outlets, and scientific societies can develop and deploy well-funded programs
based on expertly crafted messages. Successful, multi-institutional public-awareness
campaigns such as DiscoverE and the USA Science and Engineering Festival can be
emulated to address misinformation and disinformation.
15Association for Psychological Science
Atir, S., Rosenzweig, E., & Dunning, D. (2015). When knowledge knows no bounds: Self-per-
ceived expertise predicts claims of impossible knowledge. Psychological Science, 26(8), 1295–1303.
Axt, J. R., Landau, M. J., & Kay, A. C. (2020). The psychological appeal of fake-news attribu-
tions. Psychological Science, 31(7), 848–857. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620922785
Brewer, N. T., Chapman, G. B., Rothman, A. J., Leask, J., & Kempe, A. (2017). Increasing
vaccination: Putting psychological science into action. Psychological Science in the Public Interest,
18(3), 149–207. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100618760521
Brashier, N. M., & Schacter, D. L. (2020). Aging in an era of fake news. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 29(3), 316–323. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420915872
Chan, M. S., Jones, C. R., Hall Jamieson, K., & Albarracín, D. (2017). Debunking: A me-
ta-analysis of the psychological efficacy of messages countering misinformation. Psychological Sci-
ence, 28(11), 1531–1546. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714579
Fessler, D. M. T., Pisor, A. C., & Holbrook, C. (2017). Political orientation predicts cre-
dulity regarding putative hazards. Psychological Science, 28(5), 651–660. https://doi.
Hornsey, M. J. (3/30/2022). Why facts are not enough: Understanding and managing the moti-
vated rejection of science. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 29(6), 583–591. https://doi.
Kaiser Family Foundation. (n.d.). KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor. Retrieved n.d., 2022, from
Kozyreva, A., Lewandowsky, S., & Hertwig, R. (2020). Citizens versus the internet: Confront-
ing digital challenges with cognitive tools. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 21(3), 103–
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). Misinforma-
tion and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. Psychological Science in the
Public Interest, 13(3), 106–131. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018
Murphy, G., Loftus, E. F., Grady, R. H., Levine, L. J., & Greene, C. M. (2019). False memo-
ries for fake news during Ireland’s abortion referendum. Psychological Science, 30(10), 1449–1459.
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020). Fighting COVID-19
misinformation on social media: Experimental evidence for a scalable accuracy-nudge interven-
tion. Psychological Science, 31(7), 770–780. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620939054
Rapp, D. N. (2016). The consequences of reading inaccurate information. Current Directions in
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Roozenbeek, J., Freeman, A. L. J., & van der Linden, S. (2021). How accurate are accuracy-nudge
interventions? A preregistered direct replication of Pennycook et al. (2020). Psychological Science,
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van Stekelenburg, A., Schaap, G., Veling, H., & Buijzen, M. (2021). Boosting understanding
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Wahlheim, C. N., Alexandr, T. R., & Peske, C. D. (2020). Reminders of everyday misinfor-
mation statements can enhance memory for and beliefs in corrections of those statements in the
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APS recognizes the time and efforts of its members and the contributions of their research. APS
also acknowledges the work of Kim Armstrong as principal author and Charles Blue as project
manager on this white paper.
Association for Psychological Science
1800 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 402
Washington, DC 20036
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